Gongloe DissectsContempt Law Principles-Provides Public Education on ‘Prophet Key’ S/Court Ruling

MONROVIA – Amid nationwide debate following the Supreme Court’s sentencing of Prophet Key for contempt, prominent Liberian lawyer and constitutional scholar Tiawan Saye Gongloe has issued a public education commentary urging citizens to distinguish lawful criticism from speech that undermines judicial authority. While reaffirming his long record defending press freedom, Gongloe said constitutional democracy requires both free expression and responsibility, warning that reckless rhetoric against courts risks eroding public confidence in Liberia’s rule-of-law institutions. The Analyst reports.

Veteran human rights lawyer Cllr. Tiawan Saye Gongloe says the recent contempt ruling by the Supreme Court of Liberia should be understood within the framework of constitutional law rather than partisan reaction, emphasizing the need for informed public debate.

In a public education commentary titled “Contempt of Court, Freedom of Speech, and the Building of a Vibrant Democracy in Liberia,” Gongloe noted that diverse opinions about the decision are healthy in a democracy but must be grounded in legal understanding.

“Democracy thrives on disagreement,” Gongloe wrote. “It does not thrive on destruction.”

The former Solicitor General said he was not defending any individual outcome, but clarifying principles so Liberians can engage responsibly.

He cited his own history of defending journalists and activists in speech-related cases, stating, “There is no lawyer in Liberia who has defended freedom of speech and of the press on a pro bono basis more consistently than I have.”

Gongloe explained that Liberia’s Constitution guarantees free speech while holding speakers accountable for abuse of that freedom. He said contempt of court is not about protecting judges’ personal pride, but safeguarding the administration of justice.

“Courts do not possess armies,” Gongloe wrote. “They rely on public confidence. If public confidence collapses, the rule of law collapses.”

He urged citizens, lawyers, journalists, and religious leaders to elevate national discourse, stressing that criticism of court decisions is lawful, but allegations of corruption or ridicule without evidence can damage democratic institutions.

Readers are encouraged to see the full text of Cllr. Gongloe’s article BELOW this story of this edition of The Analyst for his detailed legal explanation and historical references on contempt law in Liberia.

CONTEMPT OF COURT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND THE BUILDING OF A VIBRANT DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA

A Public Education Commentary

Since the Supreme Court of Liberia rendered its decision sentencing Prophet Key to six months’ imprisonment for contempt of court, diverse views have been expressed across our country. Some have defended the ruling. Others have criticized it strongly. In a democracy, that diversity of opinion is healthy.

As someone who teaches Constitutional Law, Human Rights Law, Criminal Law, and Law and Politics at the law schools in Liberia, I consider it my public duty to promote understanding of our law. For that reason, I have decided to engage in public education on the law of contempt in Liberia. I am not doing so in order to defend any particular outcome, not to defend the judiciary per se, but to clarify the legal principles involved so that our people may engage in informed democratic discourse.

Democracy thrives on disagreement. It does not thrive on destruction.

My Record on Free Speech — Context Matters

Over the years, I have criticized decisions of the Supreme Court of Liberia in many cases. I have disagreed with reasoning, interpretation, and outcomes. But I have never done so in language that undermines the dignity, legitimacy, or institutional relevance of the Court.

That distinction matters.

There is no lawyer in Liberia who has defended freedom of speech and of the press on a pro bono basis more consistently than I have. Long before holding public office, I fought in court to secure the release of journalists and outspoken political activists who were jailed for speech-related offenses.

In 2006, when President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf offered me the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, I declined. I chose instead to serve as Solicitor General. I told her clearly that my reason for declining was that I believed I could better protect freedom of speech and freedom of the press from that position. She agreed with my reasoning.

In 2009, while serving as Solicitor General of Liberia, I could have prosecuted individuals under the laws of Sedition, Criminal Libel against the President, and Criminal Malevolence. Instead, I drafted and circulated the original proposal to repeal those laws and submitted it to the President, the Press Union of Liberia, and members of the Legislature.

I recount these facts not to boast, but to establish principle: I have consistently stood on the side of free speech. But I do not stand for recklessness and indecency, because reckless speech can undermine democracy itself.

Disagreement is the kernel of democracy.
But decency is the foundation of democratic stability.

The Constitutional Framework

Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. But it also makes the speaker responsible for the abuse of that freedom. Freedom in a constitutional democracy is never without responsibility.

The Constitution also provides lawful mechanisms for judicial accountability, including impeachment before the National Legislature. If there is credible evidence that a judge or justice has engaged in corruption or misconduct, the remedy is constitutional process — not inflammatory denunciation.

History provides an example. During the administration of President Samuel K. Doe, impeachment proceedings were reportedly contemplated against the Nagbe Bench on allegations of corruption. Before such proceedings were filed, the Justices resigned — to the amazement of the Liberian National Bar Association and the public. Whatever one’s view of that episode, it demonstrates that our Constitution provides institutional mechanisms for addressing judicial misconduct.

The rule of law demands process, not provocation.

What Is Contempt of Court?

Generally, contempt of court is conduct that tends to:

1. Bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard;

2. Interfere with or prejudice parties or witnesses during litigation;
3. Impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties.

The Supreme Court of Liberia has consistently defined contempt in these terms.

Contempt is not about protecting personal pride. It is about protecting the administration of justice.

Courts do not possess armies. They rely on public confidence. If public confidence collapses, the rule of law collapses.

The Scott & Roberts Case (1984)

In In re Scott & Roberts (1984), the Minister of Justice publicly declared:

“Public confidence in the Liberian Judicial System is at its lowest ebb ever due to the unprofessional tendency of most judges in the handling of cases; that recent daily reports reaching me from clients of several lawyers speak of lawyers and judges soliciting payments from clients but failing to deliver services. It is easier today in Liberia to prosecute a poor man successfully against government and win the case as a result of the unprofessional practice of most judges, than to convict a rich man in the court of law. Never in recent times has a so-called rich man lost a case before our courts, due to the high rate of monetary and individual interest among lawyers. If funds were available to keep surveillance on jury tampering, bribery, among others, a lot would be discovered involving some well known judges. Judges have a tendency to individualize things; and there are very few professionals in the country today.”

These were not criticisms of legal reasoning in a specific case. They were sweeping allegations of corruption, bribery, jury tampering, and bias directed at the judiciary as an institution.

The Supreme Court held that criticism of judicial decisions is permissible. But statements charging the judiciary with corruption and improper motives without proof tend to destroy public confidence in the administration of justice and therefore constitute contempt.

The Minister was disbarred for two years. The newspaper editor was fined.

Public office did not grant immunity.

The Jallah Case (1987)

In In re Joseph K. Jallah (1987), the respondent wrote:

“One funny aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision was the unfair, undemocratic and unconstitutional debarment of three lawyers, namely: Koenig, Supuwood and Garlawolo. What is incredible and unconstitutional about the ban is that the said lawyers were never parties to any conflict before the Supreme Court.”

He further referred to the ruling as:

“the debarment procedure for law not observed by the Supreme Court in its ‘Kangaro’s decision.’”

And concluded:

“Based upon the above analysis and facts, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s decision has no iota of legal merits. And one can probably infer that it is more political since in fact and in truth some members of the Court originally belonged to N.D.P.L., as argued by Mr. Kpolleh.”

The Court held that such language exposed the Court to scandal and ridicule and brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

When the respondent later apologized, the Court cited In re Caranda (1944):

“Disclaimer of intentional disrespect or design to embarrass the due administration of justice is no excuse, especially where the facts constituting the contempt are admitted…”

Apology may mitigate punishment; it does not purge contempt.

Why Is the Court Both Accuser and Judge in Contempt?

Some members of the public have asked why the Court that cites a person for contempt is also the judge in that proceeding.

The answer lies in the common law tradition.

From England to America, and from America to Liberia, contempt has always been treated as an inherent judicial power. The court whose authority is challenged must have the authority to vindicate that authority. Otherwise, judicial independence would depend on another branch of government.

In In re the Constitutionality of Sections 12.5 and 12.6 of the Judiciary Law (1975), the Legislature attempted to define criminal contempt and limit the punishment the Supreme Court could impose. The Court declared those provisions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to the Supreme Court. It held that its original jurisdiction, including the power to punish for contempt, is independent of legislative action. Contempts are sui generis — neither purely civil nor purely criminal  and the power to punish contempt is an essential element of judicial authority. A statute inconsistent with that authority is void ab initio.

Thus, the Court defines what constitutes contempt within constitutional limits and determines punishment. This principle is central to the common law tradition.

The Legal Line

The Supreme Court has made it clear:

Not every criticism is contempt.

Severe criticism confined to facts and legal reasoning is permissible.

A citizen may say:

1. “The Court misinterpreted the Constitution.”

2. “The majority erred.”
3. “This decision should be reversed.”

But what crosses the line is speech that:

1. Accuses judges of corruption without evidence;

2. Attributes decisions to political motives without proof;
3. Uses abusive language designed to ridicule or delegitimize the Court;
4. Creates distrust that undermines public confidence.

Contempt does not require proof that justice was actually obstructed. It is sufficient if the conduct tends to undermine the administration of justice.

Conclusion: The Democratic Responsibility We All Share

The purpose of this commentary has not been to defend individuals, nor to silence criticism. It has been to clarify the law and to promote constitutional understanding. A democracy grows stronger when its citizens understand both their rights and their responsibilities.

Courts must exercise their authority with wisdom and restraint. Citizens must exercise their freedoms with discipline and responsibility. The press must report boldly but fairly. Lawyers must advocate passionately but ethically. Religious leaders must speak courageously but prudently. Politicians must lead firmly but constitutionally.

All actors in the democratic space in Liberia, including judges, lawyers, journalists, religious leaders, politicians, and citizens alike, must commit themselves to building a culture of peace, responsibility, and constitutional discipline, not recklessness in any shape, manner, or form.

Democracy is not sustained by noise, but by maturity; not by provocation, but by principle.

We must remember that institutions are not abstract ideas. They are the pillars that hold up our collective freedoms. When we weaken them through reckless speech or conduct, we weaken ourselves. When we strengthen them through disciplined engagement and lawful accountability, we strengthen the Republic.

Freedom and order are not enemies. They are partners in the architecture of constitutional democracy.

If Liberia is to continue building a vibrant democratic society, we must elevate our discourse, deepen our understanding of the law, and anchor our disagreements in respect for the institutions that protect our liberties.

That is how democracies endure. That is how nations mature. And that is the collective responsibility we share.